In the War of Liberation, the most incr——. In the war of liberation, in the early stage, the People&;s Liberation Army was able to defeat the strong with the weak and win more with the few, but in the later stage, it was the crushing of absolute strength and the triumphant liberation. This is a well-known fact, however, there were some incredible battles during the war of liberation, which really puzzled people. This was the case in the battle of Linqu in South Malaysia. The battle of Nanma Linqu took place in July and August of 1947. Let&;s take a look at what the wild world has experienced this year. From January 2, 1947 to January 20, 1947, the East China Field Army spent 18 days annihilating two reorganization divisions and a fast column of the Kuomintang, totaling more than 53,000 people, and seized 24 tanks, 48 howitzers, 480 cars and more than 400 small guns. On the basis of these trophies, Hua Ye established a special artillery unit, which is the special forces column. From February 20 to February 23, 1947, in just 63 hours and less than 3 days, the East China Field Army annihilated a command post in the &”;appeasement zone&”; of the Kuomintang army, including 2 military departments and 7 divisions, with a total of more than 56,000 people. The plan of the Kuomintang army&;s north-south attack went bankrupt, Chen Cheng was ruined in this battle, and the command of the East China battlefield was replaced by Liu Zhi. From May 13th to 16th, 1947, in three days, Hua Ye concentrated its forc—— reorganization, one of the five main forces of the Kuomintang. Although Hua Ye suffered as many as 12,000 casualties, the seized gasoline and various equipment once again enabled Hua Ye to achieve leap-forward development. Incredibly, after the Battle of Menglianggu, Hua Ye suffered two consecutiv—— and the Battle of Linqu. In the past, those who said that the battle of Nanma Linqu was not a defeat but a victory were all statements to boost morale. The truth is that the battle of Nanma Linqu made Hua Ye consume almost all the captured goods in the first half of 1947, especially gasoline and gasoline, and faced a total shortage, so that in the second half of 1947, Hua Ye did not fight a big battle! Shandong, the most stable old area of the People&;s Liberation Army, was almost completely lost after these two battles. The Battle of Nanma started on July 17th. As a result, five days later, the 11th Division of the BGF led by Kuomintang Hu Lian was still sticking to a small position of less than 10 Li in Fiona Fang. When the enemy on the periphery approached, our army had to retreat from the encirclement. According to 《粟裕传》&;s record: &”;A battle in Nanma wiped out more than 9,000 officers and men below Major General Qin Daoshan of the 11th Division of Chiang Kai-shek&;s reorganization, and the East China Field Army paid the price of more than 4,000 casualties, failing to achieve the expected operational purpose and fighting a battle of consumption.&”; In 《解放战争》, Wang Shuzeng wrote that Hua Ye paid the price of more than 10,000 casualties: &”;The ninth column suffered more than 4,000 casualties, the sixth column suffered more than 2,000 casualties, and the second column responsible for frontal attack suffered more than 4,000 casualties.&”; With more than 10,000 casualties, only one regiment of the enemy will be wiped out, which is very important for participating in the war.For the various ministries of the People&;s Liberation Army, it is simply a great shame. What is even more incredible is that four Hua Ye columns, which were badly weakened in the battle of Nanma, moved to Linqu to prepare for a rest, but suddenly stormed the Eighth Army in Linqu County. On July 23rd, Hua Ye arrived a day late, and Li Mi had already taken control of all commanding heights in Linqu. On July 24th, the battle of Linqu started at dusk. After seven days and seven nights of hard work, Hua Ye failed again. There is no doubt that the direct military commander of Nanma Linqu Campaign is General Su Yu, who is known as the &”;God of War&”; of the People&;s Liberation Army. These two defeats put a lot of pressure on Su Yu. Others criticized Su Yu: &”;Su Yu, who has always been careful and cautious in fighting, decided to launch a tough battle again when the troops just suffered heavy casualties. This is not only quite adventurous, but also shows an uncontrollable impatience.&”; &”;The battle of Nanma and Linqu killed one of the 11th Division and the 8th Army of the Kuomintang, and wiped out more than 18,000 people. However, Hua Ye troops also suffered more than 21,000 casualties. &”; After the Battle of Meng Lianggu, the central government&;s evaluation was that the PLA had the opportunity to achieve nationwide expansion. Specifically, it mainly relied on the Northeast economically and Shandong militarily. Northeast China can be built into the general logistics base of the People&;s Liberation Army, but Hua Ye failed to become the vanguard of the Central Plains, largely because of these two battles. Even within the People&;s Liberation Army, there are many people who feel frustrated and sing &”;Lost Shandong&”;. More deadly is non-combat attrition. The rainy season in East China forced Hua Ye ministries to March in the mud. &”;The first and fourth columns suffered about 5,000 casualties each, and the non-combat attrition was about 5,000 each. There are three divisions in the first column. Except for the second division, there are two regiments left, and the other two divisions have only one regiment. The seventh and ninth divisions of the third column were reduced to two regiments. Nearly 2,000 people were killed in the Tenth Longitudinal Team. &”; &”;In the battle that lasted for nearly two months, Chen Su&;s army suffered a total of 50,000 combat and non-combat attrition, which was an unprecedented loss since the establishment of the East China Field Army.&”; In the telegrams of Kuomintang officers, Ye Fei column was called &”;bread&”; and Tao Yong column was called &”;watermelon&”;, which were originally the absolute main forces of Hua Ye. Tao Yong later recalled that these two months of fighting were more difficult than the Long March! After a careful analysis of Hua Ye&;s successive defeats in July, it is not difficult to find the reasons for this series of defeats: 1. In the first half of the year, Hua Ye won the battles of Lunan, Laiwu and Menglianggu in succession, and the commanders at all levels began to expand their self-confidence, resulting in the wrong decision to divide their troops and attack on all sides in July. The Battle of Nanma dealt with the reorganization of the 11th Army, one of the five main forces, and even went to four columns with the siege of Dayuan, while Meng Lianggu was nine columns with five main attacks and four Dayuan. 2. The Kuomintang has taken advantage of the right time, the right place and the right people. Meng Lianggu is not conducive to the expansion of large forces, but both Nanma Linqu are plains, and both the 11th Division and the 8th Division have given full play to their firepower advantages. Coupled with the heavy rain, our army is seriously wet, which is not conducive to combat. In the battle of Linqu, there was a flash flood.Hair, blocked our March to mobilize. 3. The Kuomintang has learned lessons such as the Battle of Meng Lianggu, and will never underestimate the enemy again. In Linqu, Nanma, Hu Lian and Li Mi both built complete bunker groups and barbed wire and other sniper fortifications, and the PLA fought for them one by one with great casualties. It is impossible to grow up quickly without experiencing failure. After these two serious failures, Hua Ye took a long rest and trained for a long time, and gradually recovered. In particular, the Hua Ye Western Corps led by Su Yu experienced the training and consolidation in Puyang in February, 1948, and its combat effectiveness was greatly improved. In one fell swoop, it won a ground-breaking victory in the battle of eastern Henan, reversed the situation in the Central Plains and opened the prelude to the strategic Armageddon.